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The First Lady Phenomenon: Elites, States & the Contradictory Politics of Women’s 
Empowerment in the Neoliberal Arab World 
 
Mayssoun Sukarieh 
Brown University 
 
Introduction 
 
“How can a revolution as great as the Egyptian one lead to a First Lady who is veiled from 
head to toe?,” asked an engineer in his thirties, commenting on a widely circulated image 
on the web that contrasted Nazli, the Queen of Egypt in the 1930s, in “modern dress” with 
her hair done and fully made up, and Naglaa Mahmoud, the wife of Mohammed Morsi, the 
first elected president of Egypt after the 2011 revolution, in traditional dress, wearing a 
headscarf and abaya. After the election of Morsi – who was subsequently ousted in a 
military coup in 2013 after just one year in power – the social media in Egypt circulated 
this and other pictures, comparing Naglaa to previous Egyptian first ladies: the unveiled 
Jihan el Sadat and Suzanne Mubarak. Jokes were widely posted that made fun of Naglaa’s 
traditional dress and popular accent; and Egyptian elites worried about Naglaa’s – and 
Egypt’s – image abroad. For them, she represented the backwardness and provincialism 
they fear1. Parallel discussions of Naglaa spread through the Western media. A profile in 
the New York Times, for example, noted that “unlike former, elegant, half-British first ladies, 
Egypt’s presidential palace is welcoming a small-town home-maker who loves to be called 
with a traditional nickname identifying her as the mother of her eldest son.”2  
 
This media and internet chatter about Naglaa Mahmoud forms part of a broad discourse 
about the desired representation of Arab and Muslim women that has been dominant in 
both the west and among Arab elites for decades. In this discourse, the Muslim/Arab 
woman stands in as a figure for the state of Muslim/Arab society. The image of the veiled 
Muslim woman, in particular, is linked with traditionalism, but also with backwardness, 
lack of freedom and empowerment; freeing, empowering and modernizing Arab and 
Muslim women have been a rallying cry and entry point for interventions in Arab and 
Muslim societies, both by the nation-state itself, and by foreign powers and international 
aid and development organizations. In this context, Naglaa Mahmoud stands in as failure, 
as the return of the traditional image of the Muslim/Arab woman at the head of one of the 
largest, most important states of the region. 
 
There has by now been an extensive critique of this discourse of the traditional Muslim and 
Arab woman. But what has received less critical attention is the figure of the modern and 
liberated Arab/Muslim woman who is supposed to replace this traditional woman. In this 
paper, I look at the representations and practice of two Arab First Ladies who, in a period 
stretching from the late 1990s through to the outbreak of the Arab Spring uprisings in late 
2010, were held up, in the Arab world and the west, as the epitome of the modern Muslim 
and Arab woman: Queen Rania of Jordan and Asma Al-Assad of Syria. More than any other 
                                                        
1 See El Sheykh, “Egypt Everywoman”; And CNN Arabic, “ Who is Nagla Morsi.” 
2 See Kirkpatrick and El Shayk, “An Egyptian Everywoman.” 
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individual in the region during this period, these two women were embraced by Arab, 
western and international media, politicians and development organizations as the most 
prominent symbols of the new Arab woman.  
 
Together, the figures of Rania and Assad offer an important opportunity to critically 
interrogate the discourse of women’s empowerment and modernization, in the context of 
the Arab and Muslim world. Not only do representations of Rania and Assad as idealized 
“modern” Arab women need to be critiqued for their sexism, materialism and classism; but 
also these representations need to be linked with the actual policy roles undertaken by 
Rania and Assad in Jordan and Syria, in which, paradoxically, they are involved in 
promoting quite different roles and representations for women from other class 
backgrounds. In other words, an analysis of Rania and Assad helps to illustrate the ways in 
which gender roles and representations, in the Arab and Muslim world as elsewhere, are 
always multiple and contradictory, varying across lines of social class, and intimately 
connected to and shaped by the ever changing political and ideological projects of states 
and elites. As such, there is a need, when addressing gender politics in the Arab and Muslim 
world, to move beyond simple stances of contesting or inverting gender representations 
(whether “traditional” or “modern”), and instead move towards constructing grounded 
analyses of how constellations of gender roles and representations are constructed and 
negotiated within the context of regional and global political economy. The analysis of 
Rania and Assad in this paper draws on a number of sources: media representations in 
western and Arab newspapers, magazines and websites; institutional documents from the 
Jordan River Foundation and Syria Trust, which are the most important NGOs run by Rania 
and Assad in their respective countries; and interviews with clients and employees of the 
Jordan River Foundation and Syria Trust, conducted during multiple short periods of 
fieldwork carried out in Jordan between 2006 and 2008, and in Syria in 2009. In the 
following pages, I also make some observations on the more recent work of these NGOs, 
that are based on follow up email conversations with interviewees, as well as analysis of 
media reports. 
 
 
Women, Empowerment & Modernization in the Arab World 
 
In a recent review article, Charrad argues that the growing literature on women and gender 
in the Arab World has tended to take “two objectives as its mandate: first, to dismantle the 
stereotype of passive and powerless Muslim women and, second, to challenge the notion 
that Islam shapes women’s condition in the same way in all places.”3 In this, the literature is 
responding critically to long-standing colonialist and Orientalist discourses, in which 
representations of “backwards”, “traditional”, “oppressed” and “disempowered” Muslim 
and Arab women have been consistently deployed by both western and indigenous elites in 
order to assert the superiority of western cultural and political practice, and legitimize 
invasion, occupation, colonization and other forms of modernizing intervention and 
development projects in the region.4 Critique of this discourse, as Charrad and others have 
                                                        
3 See Charrad, “Gender in the Middle East.” 
4 See Abu Lughod, Remaking Women; Ahmed, Women and Gender; and Moallem, Warrior Brother. 
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pointed out, is by now well developed, and representations of traditional Arab and Muslim 
women as being universally and uniformly disempowered and oppressed have been widely 
challenged by numerous ethnographic and social historical studies, that have sought to 
document both the complexity of gender relations in the Arab and Muslim worlds, and the 
resourcefulness, power and agency of Arab and Muslim women, in both individual and 
collective capacities, and within both private, domestic and public and political spheres. 5 
 
In comparison to the critical literature on roles and representations of traditional Arab and 
Muslim women, critical reflection on the counterposing roles and representations of 
“modern” or “westernized” Arab and Muslim women is much less developed. There is a 
long critical tradition that contests the oppositions of tradition/modernity and east/west 
themselves, and that purports to show that “traditional” Arab and Muslim women are, in 
fact, themselves “modern,” both in the sense that their identities and practices are of the 
contemporary era and not relics from some unchanging past, but also in the sense that they 
possess the characteristics stereotypically associated with the “modern woman”: i.e., they 
are liberal, liberated and empowered.6 There has also been a long tradition of anti-western 
politics throughout the Arab world that critiques images of “modern” and “western” 
women and their claims to liberalism, liberty and empowerment. For decades, both leftists 
and Islamists in the Arab region have scorned “the frivolous, empty-headed modern 
woman, exploited and manipulated, financially and sexually, by Western capitalism and its 
corrupting culture,” basing their critiques not just on indigenous Arab and Muslim 
practices and values, but also “on Western critiques of modernity and capitalism from 
Friedrich Nietzsche, Marx, Fanon and Jean-Paul Sartre.”7 
 
A third and more recent tradition, on which this article builds, moves beyond broad 
oppositions and inversions of traditional/modern and east/west binaries, to look more 
closely and critically at the ways in which multiple and often contradictory gender roles 
and representations for Arab and Muslim women have been mobilized and promoted 
across different social classes, geographical sites and institutional locations, by states, elites 
and capital operating in specific institutional and ideological contexts.8 As we look at the 
history of debates and conflicts over the roles and representations of Arab and Muslim 
women, we can see that while initially these were driven by the projects of state formation 
and development, in the context of colonialism and national liberation movements, more 
recently, in the neoliberal era, it has increasingly been civil society and NGOs that stand at 
the heart of discussions about women, empowerment and development.9 Initially, the rise 
                                                        
5 See Abu Lughod, “ Dialects of Women empowerment”; Adley, Educating women for Development; Ghannam,” 
Mobility, Liminality and Embodiement”; Hafez, An Islam of her Own; Hale, Gender, Politics in Sudan; and 
Moghadam, “ Islamic Feminism and its Discontents.” 
6 for example, Hatem’s study of Aisha Taymur6, an Egyptian poet in the early twentieth century; or Badran and 
Cooke’s edited collection of stories of Arab feminists from throughout the twentieth century.6 It is also characterized 
by ethnographic studies such as Deeb’s work on women in Hezbollah in Lebanon6, and Mahmood’s work on 
women’s participation in the Islamist movement in Egypt, both of which argue that these supposedly traditionalist 
organizations in fact constitute alternative forms of modernity 
7 See Zubaida, Beyond Islam, 194. 
8 See, A special issue of the Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies in 2010, for example, examines the rise of the 
“Islamic culture industry” and analyzes the ways in which “contemporary Muslim femininities are increasingly 
mediated through the market forces of consumer capitalism, impacting Muslim women’s identities, lifestyles, and 
belonging in complex ways.” 8Similarly, Kassam draws on Mamdani’s “good Muslim, bad Muslim” framework to 
analyze how media marketed to Muslim women in the west construct idealized images of the modern Muslim 
woman who is “Western and Muslim,” and “portrayed as liberal, educated, fashionable, a ‘can-do’ woman, who is 
also committed to her faith.” 
9 See Bernal and  Grewal, Theorizing NGOs.  
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of NGOs during the 1980s was celebrated as promising to usher in a brave new world of 
women’s liberation and empowerment across the globe.10 However, there is by now a well 
developed critical literature on the decidedly mixed and even harmful significance of many 
NGOs for women and development throughout the global South. For the rise of NGOs has 
often not been experienced by poor and low income women as being empowering and 
liberating; rather, NGOs have worked to produce continued dependency and subordination, 
while depoliticizing the women’s movement.11 Critics have focused attention on the 
problematic ways in which NGOs serve the top-down interests of foreign donors and 
nation-states;12 on the domination of leadership positions within NGOs by elite and middle 
class women;13 on the promotion by NGOs of neoliberal subject positions – the 
entrepreneurial and responsibilized individual – that cover for the withdrawal of the state 
and consequent loss of rights and entitlements;14 and on the ways which NGOs often 
endorse and accommodate, rather than contest traditional forms and relationships of 
patriarchal power.15 
 
This article builds on this critical literature on NGOs, women and development, while 
seeking to extend it in two ways. First, much of this literature has been produced in 
countries characterized by weak states (such as Bangladesh), where international and 
national NGOs have stepped in to fill a void left by state absence. In both Syria and Jordan, 
however, NGOs have developed in national contexts characterized by strong states, with 
extensive security apparatuses, and have been used by the state itself in support of its 
interests. Second, many studies of NGOs, women and development have tended to focus on 
the engagements of NGOs with women from single social classes (in most cases, the poor). 
This study argues for the importance of widening our analytical gaze. In order to 
understand the significance of neoliberalism, NGOs, and gender roles and representations 
in the contemporary period, we need to look across lines of social class, to examine how 
different roles and representations are mobilized simultaneously for women of different 
class backgrounds, as they participate and are forced to participate in conjoined projects of 
social, political and economic reform.  
 
 
First Lady Media Representations: Promoting Arab Modernity 
 
If the standard representation of the traditional, disempowered Arab and Muslim woman is 
a generic, anonymous, veiled woman dressed in black, two of the most iconic 
representations of her ostensible opposite – the modernized, empowered, liberated and 
educated Arab and Muslim woman – have been the First Ladies of Syria and Jordan. For 
more than a decade at the start of the twenty-first century, Queen Rania and Asma Al-Assad 
were two of the most widely pictured Arab and Muslim women in the western media, 
showing up not just in foreign news sections, but in fashion magazines, popular culture and 
celebrity literature such as Vogue Magazine, Paris Match and Elle. A simple search for 
                                                        
10 See Appadurai, “ Deep Democracy”; Fisher, Nongovernments: and Abdulrahman, Civil Society. 
11 See Bernal and Grewal, Theorizing NGOs; And Karim, Microfinance and its Discontents. 
12 See Jad, “The Demobilization of a Palestinian Woman.” 
13 SeeBernal and Grewal, Theorizing; Clark, “Women and NGO Professionalization,” 2013; And Jad, “ the 
NGOisation of Arab Women.” 
14  See Brand, Women, the State; And Elyachar, Markets of Dispossession. 
15 See Elyachar, Markets of Dispossession; Ghodsee, 2” Feminism by Design,”; and Karim “ Politics of the Poor.” 
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journalistic articles results in 4 million hits for Queen Rania and around 800,000 for Asma 
Assad. Rania has 200,000 images posted on the web, compared to 22,000 for Assad. In 
almost all of these media depictions, Rania and Assad are explicitly and repeatedly referred 
to as “modern” women who are trying to “modernize” their own countries. Vanity Fair, for 
example, refered to Queen Rania in 2003 as being an “ultra-modern monarch”16; while 
Vogue described Rania in 2009 as “modern, hip, and … demure”.17 Similarly, NBC presented 
Assad in 2007 as being a “surprisingly modern first lady,”18 while a high profile Vogue 
article on Assad in 2011 portrated her as “glamorous, young, and very chic – the freshest 
and most magnetic of first ladies.” 19 
 
Such portrayals of the Syrian and Jordanian First Ladies as being modern, liberated and 
empowered were not solely the product of popular media. Rather, they were closely tied to 
western state interests and agendas within the Arab region: as western states pursued 
policies of engagement (in the case of Jordan) and rapprochement (in the case of Syria), 
their elected politicians, diplomats and civil servants played an active role in promoting 
such popular culture celebrations of Rania and Assad; and as they moved, in the wake of 
the Arab spring uprisings, into a stance of distancing and outright opposition to Jordanian 
and Syrian state elites, both political and popular enthusiasm for the ostensible modernity 
of Rania and Assad quickly disappeared from view. US Congressman Mark Kirk thus told 
Vanity Fair in 2003 that when he meets with King Abdullah and Queen Rania, “it feels like 
you’re talking to a modern American couple,” since “she talks as much as he does, taking a 
very large role – with the same educational level and confidence. When Queen Rania takes 
the lead, his body language is ‘Yeah, Rania, go! Tell him!’”20 The French ambassador to 
Syria, meanwhile, told Vogue in 2011 of the political importance of Assad, explaining how 
“she managed to get people to consider the possibilities of a country that’s modernizing 
itself, that stands for a tolerant secularism in a powder-keg region.”21  
 
The particular version of the idealized modern Arab and Muslim woman that is promoted 
by these representations of Rania and Assad is a stereotype that has long been criticized by 
western feminists, Arab nationalists, leftists and Islamists alike. First, these representations 
have been highly sexualized, fetishized and objectified. Media accounts of both Rania and 
Assad during this period almost always focused closely on their bodies, body parts and 
physical appearance. Rania is described as “willowy,” “swan-necked,” “glamorous, stunning, 
beautiful, tall, slim, skinny, [with] slender fingers, thick, mahogany hair, dark eyes,” a “prim 
smile,” “wide brow” and a “smooth, heart-shaped stretch from the cheekbone down to the 
neck [that] sings in milky harmony.”22 Assad, likewise, was regularly referred to as being 
“beautiful,” “glamorous” and “chic,” with comments made about her “rosy cheeks,” natural 
hair, natural smile, long thin legs, “thin long limbs,” and model-like walk.23 Second, media 
representations construct the First Ladies’ identity and achievement in terms of their 
                                                        
16 See Bennets “Star of Jordan, 253”;  
17 See Woods, “ Queen Rania: Modern Appeal,”  
18 See Vogue, “Power Monarch,” 
19 See Buck, “ Asma el Assad,” ; And Williams, “ First Lady Asma,”. 
20 See Bennet, “ Star of Jordan,” 252. 
21 See Buck, “ Asma el Assad,”. 
22 See Bennetts, “ Star of Jordan,”; The New Zealand Herald, “Royal Beauties,” ; Telegraph,” Top Five Royal”; 
And the Star, “King and Queen.”). 
23 See Buck, “ Asma al Assad,”; Malek, “ Syria’s First Lady,”; Saeed, “ Asma el Assad,” ; and the Huffington 
Post,” Asma el Assad,”.  
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consumerist choices, focussing obsessively on their clothing, luxury branding, fashion and 
shopping.24 Ironically, as western political relations with Syria shifted dramatically in wake 
of Syrian uprisings of 2011, such consumerism became dramatically inverted, now 
portrayed as a sign not of modernity and liberation, but of backwards and boorish 
behavior.25 This is just one striking example of how gender roles and representations of 
Arab and Muslim women are contingent, and continually shaped and re-shaped by broader 
relations of regional and global political economy. Third, media representations of the First 
Ladies of Syria and Jordan also celebrated them as ideal, modern Arab and Muslim women 
to the degree that they could be seen as products not of the Orient but of the west. 
Portrayals that celebrated Rania and Assad’s western upbringing and education, their 
command of the English language, and their employment histories in some of the leading 
capitalist firms of Europe and North America.26  
 
The promotion of Rania and Assad as iconic images of the ideal, modern Arab and Muslim 
woman, it needs to be recognized, also involves the promotion of a very particular class-
based culture that is linked with Arab elites in Syria, Jordan and the rest of the Arab region. 
This is a culture that is largely inaccessible to most of Arab female popularion, due to its 
excessive costs – and indeed, could be argued to linked to broader processes of 
impoverisation of Arab women as a whole. But it also reflects particular culture choices and 
preferences of Arab upper and professional middle classes, centered around extravagant 
and conspicuous consumption of designer goods, life histories of study and employment in 
western schools and corporations, and fluency in and extensive use of the English language 
in everyday interactions.27 By promoting these images as ideal of modern, empowered, 
liberated Arab and Muslim woman, media and political figures works both to legitimize 
these classes, and hold their wealth and practices out as being something not to question 
and contest, but rather to aspire to as the route to joining the modern age writ large. 
 
 
First Lady NGO Practices: The Contradictory Forms of Arab Women’s 
“Empowerment” 
 
The class-based and class-delimited nature of the roles and representations of the modern 
Arab and Muslim woman that is exemplified by media representations of the Jordanian and 
Syrian First Ladies becomes even more apparent when we examine the actual political 
engagements and practices of Queen Rania and Asma Assad. Both Rania and Asma have 
been deeply and centrally involved in the launching and operation of NGOs in their 
respective countries – an engagement typical both of the contemporary neoliberal era, and 
of the longer-standing associations of the westernized “First Lady” role with charitable 
endeavours.28 Indeed, it is precisely because of this deep involvement that the First Ladies 
provide such a useful lens for seeing up close the contradictions and multiplicities of 
gender roles and representations that often exist within single political-economic reform 
                                                        
24 See Carbonnel Vogue Magazine Dumps Asma,” ; Bennets “ The Enigma of Damascus,”; And Malik,” Syria’s 
First Lady,” ) 
25 See Malek, “ Syria’s First Lady,”; And Ramadani, “ Asma el Assad is no reformer,”. 
26  See Buck, “Asma el Assad,”. 
27 See Beal, “ Real Jordanians Do not Decorate”:And Schwedler,”Amman Cosmopolitan.” 
28 See Erikson& Thomson, “ first Lady International Diplomacy,”; Gould, American First Ladies ; Gutin, The 
President’s Parner. 
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projects in the Arab world, stretching across differences of social class. While political and 
economic contexts in Syria and Jordan over the past decades have been very different – 
both internally, for example in terms of state type (i.e., republic vs. monarchy), and 
externally, for example in terms of roles played in the US-led war on terror – the roles of 
the First Ladies, and the social function and significance of NGOs in both countries has been 
quite parallel. In both cases, the introduction and spread of NGOs has been closely linked to 
the neoliberalization of the economy; NGOs have been closely controlled by the state, as a 
way to control social movements and absorb tensions created by the withdrawal of the 
state from providing social services; and NGOs have focused their energies, in particular, on 
women, youth and the poor. 
 
In Jordan, which has long been one of the poorest countries in the Arab world, with few 
natural resources, a limited private sector, and a heavy dependence on foreign aid – which 
it is able to attract, in large part, due to its geopolitically strategic importance for British 
and later American foreign policy interests  – economic crisis and a growing debt burden 
led in the 1980s to the imposition of a World Bank structural adjustment program and the 
forced neoliberalization of its economy. 29As elsewhere in the world, these reforms led to 
growing economic inequality in the country, and a consequent rise in social unrest; NGOs 
were introduced to Jordan during this period, with the direct goal of containing this unrest, 
and protecting the continued neoliberalization of the economy. 30Unlike other countries in 
the global South, NGOs in Jordan are dominated by the state, even as they are heavily 
dependent on international, and, in particular, US funding and guidance. The most 
important NGOs in the country, which control more than 70% of civil society funding, are 
known as Royal NGOs (or RONGOs), which are established by royal decree, patronized by 
individual members of the royal family, and not subject to the same legal restrictions as 
other NGOs.31 Queen Rania directs the largest RONGO in Jordan, the Jordan River 
Foundation (JRF), which in 2009 had an annual budget of 10 million Jordanian dollars, and 
which targets disadvantaged social groups, especially women, through capacity building, 
education and training, and the provision of micro-credit.32The JRF was actually founded by 
Queen Noor in 1995, the stepmother-in-law of Rania and consort to King Hussein; but 
Rania took over the foundation upon King Abdullah’s ascension to power in 1999. In many 
ways, the roles and representations of Queen Rania in Jordan represent a continuation of 
images and practices that had already been established earlier by other members of the 
royal family, including Queen Noor and Princess Basma, who started the first NGO in 
Jordan, the Jordanian National commission for Women, which developed to include work 
with youth, children and the disabled.33  
Unlike Jordan, Syria has long positioned itself as an anti-imperialist state, opposed to 
western influence and intervention, officially embracing state socialism and having close 
ties with the former Soviet bloc.34 However, in the early 1990s, following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, and facing growing economic crisis and debts, Syria, too, embarked on a 
                                                        
29 See Hanieh, Lineages of Revolt ; Brand, Women, State. 
30 SeeBrand Women, state ; Seif, “ Middle Class in Jordan,”; Robinson “defensive Democratisation.” 
31 See Brand, Women, State; Robinson,” Defensive Demoratization,”; And Clark and Michuke, “Women and NGO 
professionalization.” 
32 See Brand Women, State; And Clark and Michuke,” Women and NGO professionalization.”  
33 See Wiktorowisz “the Political Limits.” 
34 See Dahi, “Understanding the Political Economy,”; And Haddad,” The Syrian Regime.”  
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process of neoliberalizing its economy under the banner of social market economy.35As 
elsewhere, privatization of state-run industries, opening the country to foreign investment 
and – especially after the ascension to power of Bashar Assad in 2000 – extensive cuts to 
state subsidies and health and education provision, led to dramatic increases in economic 
inequality.36In response to concerns about the potential for social unrest, the Syrian state 
sanctioned, for the first time, the creation and operation of NGOs in the country – however, 
this process occurred much later than in Jordan, with NGOs proliferating only since the 
start of the twenty-first century.37. As in Jordan, the voluntary sector in Syria is dominated 
by government organized NGOS (or GONGOs); and Asma Assad, as Syrian First Lady, 
created in 2007 and then ran the largest of these GONGOS, which is known as the Syria 
Trust. The Trust had a budget of three million US dollars in 2010, which constituted about 
80 percent of the funds for civil society groups in the entire country . Like the Jordan River 
Foundation, the Syria Trust targeted primarily the poor, women and youth, through a range 
of funded projects that provide education and training, promote entrepreneurship and 
celebrate cultural heritage; in doing so, it worked with government ministries and 
municipalities, the Syrian private sector, international funding agencies and the World 
Bank. Unlike Queen Rania in Jordan, however, the image and role adopted by Asma Assad 
as a civil society promoting First Lady had to be created essentially from scratch in Syria, as 
there had been little precedent for such representations or practices.38 Also, Unlike Rania 
who runs the NGO from the royal court, Asma directs the NGO herself and “ she is present 
in the office like all employees from 9-5 to receive reports, discuss ideas and help writing 
proposals.” 39  
What is particularly striking when we look closely at the work of Rania and Assad in their 
respective NGOs are the contradictions and differences in gender roles and representations 
that are promoted across lines of social class.  
As is the case with NGOs elsewhere in the world, Jordan and Syria’s RONGOs and GONGOs 
tend to be dominated by professional, middle class women, who are employed to work on 
and with poor women; as such, these NGOs tend to be strongly shaped by the interests and 
perspectives not only of the donors but also by that of middle class women.40Clark and 
Michuki’s study of NGO staffing in Jordan thus found that “the labour force in Jordan’s 
advocacy NGOs tends to be dominated by highly educated women, many with post-
graduate degrees from the West, whose motivations are guided not solely by gender 
considerations but rather by a combination of career aspirations and support for the NGOs’ 
objectives.”41 Similarly, Kabbani’s  study of the Syria Trust reports that the Trust “attracted 
mostly middle class women who either studied in the UK or US, or in the English language 
schools in Syria. One of the conditions of working for the Trust was proficiency in writing 
and reading English, and this restricted the pool to upper middle class women.”42 These 
trends at least raise the question of whose interests – those of middle class or poor women 
– are most fully being served by these NGOs.43 
                                                        
35 See Joya “ the Syrian Revolution.”  
36 See Dahi,” Understanding the Political Economy,”; And  Joya, “ the Syrian Revolt.” 
37 See Kabbani, “ civil Soceity in Syria.”  
38 SeeKabbani,” Civil Soceity” 
39 Personal Interview with Kabbani, April, 12, 2009. 
40 SeeAbdel Rahman,  Civil Soceity; Bernal & Grewal, Theorizing NGOs; And Vasan, NGO as Employer.” 
41 See Clark and Michuki, 330) 
42 See Kabbani, “ Civil Soceity,”11) 
43 See Abdel Rahman, Civil Society 
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There is, however, much more to the story of gender and class divides in Jordanian and 
Syrian NGOs than the simple staffing predominance of the professional middle class. Both 
the Jordan River Foundation and the Syria Trust, like NGOs elsewhere around the world in 
the contemporary neoliberal period, are deeply involved in promoting entrepreneurialism 
as a central solution to social problems, and in fashioning what has been described as the 
“entrepreneurial subject” – that is, a subject who is a “self-entrepreneur,” has or seeks 
“economic independence,” and is characterized by being “self confident and self reliant.44” 
However, the gendered and entrepreneurial roles being promoted by these NGOs vary 
across lines of social class: in order words, there is not just one neoliberal, entrepreneurial 
subject being created among the women involved with these NGOs, but multiple such 
subject-positions, each shaped by gender and class.   
 
There are, in fact, at least three distinct tiers of entrepreneurial subjects in the JRF and 
Syrian Trust. At the top level, both Queen Rania and Asma Assad are referred to and refer 
to themselves as “social entrepreneurs.” It is not just that they seek to train and support the 
poorest citizens of their countries to become “successful,” “self-reliant” and “productive” 
individuals, moving out of the trap of “hopelessness” and “dependence;” rather, both 
women are widely represented as themselves being independent, working women, who 
constructed high level careers for themselves in finance and technology, before creating 
and running their own large scale NGOs with the ambitious agendas of radically reshaping 
social attitudes and practices among the general.45As one Syrian journalist (and former 
consultant to Asma Assad) wrote in 2008: 
 
For over 60 years, the role of Arab first ladies was confined to … charity 
organizations, intellectual forums, and official ceremonies…. Things changed 
dramatically, however, in recent years with the coming of … young first ladies to 
power in … Amman and Damascus. They enchanted Arab societies with their grace 
and elegance, but soon enough, began to take on increasingly active roles as 
businesswomen, entrepreneurs, and nation-builders. (Moubayed, 2008) 
 
But the entrepreneurial roles that Rania and Assad occupied as First Ladies up until the 
Arab spring uprisings were strongly shaped by their gender and class identities. Their 
privileged positions as heads of two of the most significant NGOs in their respective 
countries came as courtesy of their marriage to the ruling heads of state, and would not 
otherwise have been accessible or possible; while their relatively marginalized status in 
civil society rather than state leadership positions was shaped by the clearly gendered 
division of power and labour between state and civil society within Jordan and Syria, a 
pattern similar to many other countries around the world.46 
 
At a second level, the professional middle class women who comprise the bulk of the paid 
workforce of the Jordan River Foundation and Syria Trust themselves constitute a different 
kind of neoliberal, entrepreneurial, flexible citizen-subject. In a previous era, these are 
                                                        
44 See Karim, “Politics of Poor,”, pp. XXX; And Elyachar, Markets of Dispossessions. 
45 See King 2012; Malik, “ Syria’s First Lady,”; And Moubayed, “ A queen, A sheikha.” 
46 See Abdelrahman, Civil Society. 
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women who would have worked directly for the state in secure, permanent positions; now, 
however, they must construct themselves as flexible, enterprising subjects, who must be 
willing to recreate themselves constantly, as they move between various short-term, 
insecure, contract-based positions in the voluntary sector. Haifa Dia Al-Attia, the CEO of 
Queen Rania’s Foundation for Education and Development (within which the JRF is 
situated) is a typical example: Al-Attia began her career in Jordan working directly for the 
Ministry of Education, before moving into independent consultancy, and then later joining 
Queen Rania’s Foundation; Al-Attia insists on defining success not in terms of money 
earned or status or position of prominence achieved, but rather in terms of a more protean 
commitment to continually building “her expertise and experience,” and focusing on “the 
value you add to your life and the lives of others” (quoted in Anderson, 2014). Similarly, a 
contract researcher who worked for the Syria Trust for three years, from 2007 to 2010, 
explains that: 
 
I have worked on projects that range from mobile libraries for kids to microcredit for 
women in rural area, and I worked as an administrator and as a trainer. This gives me a 
chance to keep learning and keep recreating myself, unlike work in public or private 
sectors. (Personal interview, May, 2, 2009) 
 
Clark and Michuki’s study of NGOs in Jordan found that flexibility and enterpreneurship 
were experienced by these women as both an attraction and liability of NGO work: while 
NGO employees complain of the lack of job security, they also speak of being attracted to 
the non-profit sector for its challenge and variety: “An NGO career grows differently from 
careers in the private sector: horizontally and not vertically. While in the private sector you 
would move up the ladder, but the job would remain the same. In an NGO you are able to 
move around to different jobs.”47 Unlike Rania and Assad, these professional middle class 
NGO executives, employees and contract workers tend not to create or invent new projects 
and enterprises, but must be enterprising in their willingness to continually execute the 
projects and enterprises of their funders and employers. And unlike the mostly poor 
women of Jordan and Syria who constitute these NGOs’ principal subjects and clients, they 
are salaried employees; and they are primarily English speaking, highly educated, and 
westernized in their dress and consumer tases, forms of cultural capital which are highly 
shaped by their wealthy, middle and upper class family backgrounds. 
 
Finally, on a third level, are the mostly poor women who are the primary concern and 
clientele of the Jordan River Foundation and Syria Trust. Both NGOs provide training and 
micro-finance grants to poor women to help these women develop themselves as 
entrepreneurs, creating small handicraft-based businesses that can form the heart of 
“healthier, self-reliant, aspiring communities.”48 Cut off from the state largesse on which 
Rania and Assad themselves continue to be able to draw, and blocked by a combination of 
poverty and state defunding of public education from being able to access even the salaried 
employment of the professional middle class contract employees who run the Jordan River 
Foundation and Syria Trust on a day-to-day basis, these women are taught by these NGOS 
                                                        
47 Clark and Michuki’, “Women and NGO,”336. 
48 See Jordan River Foundation, 2004,  19;  Firdos Microcredit Programme, Website). 
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to look instead to themselves and their own communities for sources of economic 
sustenance in the contemporary neoliberal world. As one middle aged rural peasant 
woman participating in a JRF microcredit program reflects, NGO staff “are constantly telling 
us how great our culture is, and how much we can make out of it, if we just learn how to 
market it. We are constantly told to depend on ourselves and our communities and to think 
locally” (personal interview, June,20, 2012). As a Trust trainer in Firdos Program in Syria 
explains,  
 
teach rural women what they already used to do, like making pickles, provisions, 
jams, or even growing bees for their families, with subsidies from the state to sell in 
the market. The difference is now they have to live on the little money, if ever they get 
from these, to pay for their family’s education, their health and everything, while they 
used to be covered before. (Personal interview, 20 April, 2009). 
 
This raises a further contradiction in the different gender roles and representations 
mobilized by Rania and Assad’s NGO projects in Jordan and Syria. It is not just that poor 
women are trained to expect a different relationship with the state and formal employment 
systems to that enjoyed by the First Ladies and their professional middle class employees; 
nor just that the levels of social, political and economic wealth that are attached to claims of 
“women’s empowerment” vary dramatically between the First Ladies, NGO staff and poor 
women clientele. It is also that NGOs such as the JRF and Syria Trust teach poor women in 
Syria and Jordan that the path to women’s empowerment lies not in turning away from 
“traditional” forms of Arab culture and social practice and embracing western and 
“modern” forms of culture and practice – as both the First Ladies and NGO staff tend to do – 
but rather by embracing, exploiting and more fully embedding themselves within the realm 
of Arab traditionalism. 
 
Most of the microcredit programs run by both the JRF and Syria Trust are tailored to 
reinforcing traditional women’s work: weaving, embroidery, handicrafts of all sorts, as well 
as making provisions. What poor women do in their own homes becomes a commodity to 
be sold through the NGO to urban consumers or international tourists, through centers and 
fairs that promote and celebrate traditionalism and village life. In some cases, like the 
promotion of traditional dresses, women who weave the dresses cannot afford to buy them 
themselves, instead they make them for sale and consumption by upper middle class 
women in the cities. More than this, NGOS such as the JRF and Syria Trust seek to promote 
and embed neoliberal cultures of responsibilisation within the general population, by 
linking these cultures explicitly and directly with forms and practices of “traditional” Arab 
culture. Common capacity building workshops thus often start with a focus on how “Arab 
culture” is a “collective culture,” in which Arab people help each other and take care of each 
other. Queen Rania refers to traditional Arab culture as a “culture of empathy,” while Assad 
refers to it as a “culture of cooperation and exchange.” “We try to work within the structure 
of the family by providing women with work they can do inside their households and in a 
way to keep the traditional role,” says Maha Khatib, the CEO of the Jordan River Foundation 
(personal interview, April, 20, 2007). This is the same traditional Arab culture, however, 
that in other contexts may be criticized for its backwardness, patriarchal nature, and 
disempowering and oppressive impacts on Arab and Muslim women (see Karim (2014) 
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and Elychar (2006) for discussions of similar contradictions in NGO work with women in 
Bangladesh and Egypt). Ironically, then, the two First Ladies of Jordan and Syria, who are so 
widely held up to be the epitome of the modern, empowered and liberated Arab and 
Muslim woman, not only are participating directly in introducing new, neoliberal forms of 
governance that many argue are deeply disempowering of women (and men) in their 
countries, but they also turn out to be directly promoting traditional forms of women’s 
status and work in the region – only in service of introducing and embedding a new, 
neoliberal form of governance.  
It is important to mention, finally, that despite the similarities discussed above, there are 
differences in the work of the JRF and Syria Trust resulting from an array of different 
factors, including the different make-ups of the national economies in Jordan and Syria, 
different histories of political institutions and relationships, and different impacts of 
neoliberal reforms on the populations. These differences, however, are not the focus of this 
paper, and to be elucidated fully, would require further empirical research to that already 
conducted. 
 
 
Conclusion 
  
At the end of her review article on the academic literature on gender in the Middle East, 
Charrad argues that “in many ways, scholars of gender in the Middle East are still caught in 
the discourse of Orientalism,” and calls for researchers “to overcome the Middle Eastern 
tradition/ Western modernity false binary once again … and to be aware of the complex 
ground we tread on at this particular historical time.” 49The period that has been analyzed 
here lasted only from the late 1990s through to the start of the Arab Spring uprisings at the 
end of 2010. In the face of widespread, popular demands for democracy throughout the 
Arab region, western political elites moved to distance themselves from autocratic regimes 
such as the Jordanian monarchy and Syrian Republic. Media portrayals and public 
appearances of Queen Rania declined dramatically in the wake of the uprisings; while Asma 
Assad, in the context of the outbreak of a brutal civil war in Syria, was vilified in the 
western media as being the wife of a cruel dictator, and condemned for many of the same 
consumerist practices for which she had previously been celebrated (Guardian, 2011). 
Queen Rania’s Jordan River Foundation continued to operate, while the Syria Trust was 
closed down in 2012, after operating as a humanitarian organization for a year(Guardian 
2012, Qabbani 2012). These sudden reversals and changes of fortune are clear indicators of 
how closely tied gender representations are to the workings of regional and global political 
economy. 
  
As the region moved into a new and uncertain period post-Arab spring, new contestations 
over the appropriate roles and representations of Arab and Muslim women came to the 
foreground. One of these were not restricted to the concerns of Nagla discussed at the 
beginning of this article, but extends to others. For example, discussions abound about the 
role of women in protests especially that women participation occupied western media 
depiction of the revolution; claims about sexual harassment and violence in protests and 
                                                        
49 Charrad (2011, p. 431) 
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the formation of NGOs and groups to protest this; decision by the young Egyptian woman 
to pose naked which was depicted as liberation of the body and contested by others as 
enslavement of woman’s body. As scholars and others move to analyze and understand 
these new claims about Arab and Muslim women’s roles and representations, what is vital 
is that we move beyond a simple politics of focusing on, contesting and inverting single 
images, whether these be of ostensibly “traditional” and “oppressed” women, or “modern” 
and “liberated” women. Instead, what this article has argued for is the importance of the 
simultaneous analysis of different images of women in order to better understand the 
political economy of women images in in certain historical context.. The simultaneous 
analysis enables us not only to examine how different roles and representations are 
mobilized simultaneously for women of different class backgrounds, as they participate 
and are forced to participate in conjoined projects of social, political and economic reform, 
but also such images are subject to change and are not fixed depending on the interest of 
capital. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
References 
Abu-Lughod Lila. Writing Women’s Worlds: Bedouin Stories. Berkeley: University of  
California Press, 2008 
Abu-Lughod Lila, ed.  Remaking Women: Feminism and Modernity in the Middle East. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998. 
 Abu-Lughod Lila. Veiled Sentiments: Honor and Poetry in a Bedouin Society. Berkeley: Univ. 
Calif. Press,1999 2nd ed.   
Abu-Lughod Lila. “Dialects of Women’s Empowerment: the International Circuitry of the 
Arab Human Development Report 2005.” International Journal of Middle East Studies. 41 
(2009):83–103   
Adely Fida. “Educating Women for Development: the Arab Human Development Report 
2005 and the Problem with Women’s Choices.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 
41(2009):105–22 
Ahmed Leila. Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate. New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 1992 
Ahmed Leila. The Veil Debate—Again. In On Shifting Ground: Muslim Women in the Global 
Era, ed. Fereshteh Nouraie-Simone, pp. 53–171. New York: Fem. Press City Univ. N. Y, 2009. 
 15 
Al-Ali Nedje. Secularism, Gender, and the State in the Middle East: The Egyptian Women’s 
Movement. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 
Al-Ali Nedje, Pratt N. What Kind of Liberation? Women and the Occupation of Iraq. Berkeley: 
Univeristy of  California Press, 2009  
Akkad, Nour. ‘Asma Al-Assad: Syria’s First Lady and all-natural beauty’, Huffington Post, 6 
Jun., [Online] Available at:http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/07/17/asma-al-assad- 
syrias-firs_n_226714.html (14 Nov. 2012). 
AL-MAHADIN, SALAM ‘Arab media studies: towards a poetics of diversity’, Feminist Media 
Studies, 11 (2011): 1,1–12. 
Appadurai. Arjun. Deep Democracy: Urban Governmentality and the Horizon of Politics.” 
Public Culture 14 (2009): 21– 47.     
Badran Margot. Feminists, Islam, and Nation: Gender and the Making of Modern Egypt. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University. Press,1995 
 Badran Margot. Feminism in Islam: Secular and Religious Convergences. Oxford: One 
world,2009 
. Badran Margot, Cooke Myriam, eds. Opening the Gates: An Anthology of Arab Feminist 
Writing. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004. 
Baron Beth. Egypt as a Woman: Nationalism, Gender, and Politics. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2005 
Beal, Anne. Real Jordanians Do not Decorate Like That! The Politics of Taste Amongst 
Amman Elites. City and Soceity 7(2000), 65-94. 
Bernal Victoria, and Inderpal Grewal. Theorizing NGOs: States, Feminisms and 
Neoliberalisms. North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2014. 
Astoelke , A. 2010. Asma et Bachar el-Assad: Deux Amoureus a Paris. Paris Match.  
BBC News. Jordan’s Queen Rania has influence in Social Media. October 10. 
 BBC News 2010. October 8, 2010 Friday. Queen Rania named one of world's 100 most 
powerful women 
Bennets, Leslie. 2003. Star of Jordan. Vanity Fair, September 517, 254.  
Bennet, James .2005. The Enigma of Damascus’, New York Times, 10 Jul., p. E28.   
Buck, Joan Juliet. Asma Al Asad: A Rose in the desert Vogue 202(2011). 
http://blogs.aljazeera.net/middle-east/2012/04/19/blush-syrias-rose-desert 
Beck Lois, Keddie Nikki, eds. Women in the Muslim World. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
 16 
University Press, 1978.  
Booth Marilyn. May Her Likes Be Multiplied: Biography and Gender Politics in Egypt. 
Berkeley: University of California Press,2001 
Brand Laurie . Women, the State, and Political Liberalization: Middle Eastern and North 
African Experiences. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998 
Carbonell, L. Vogue Magazine Dumps Asma al-Assad. Al Jazeera, April 27, 2012. 
Charrad, Mounira. 2011. Gender in the Middle East: Islam, States, Agency, Annual   Review 
of Sociology. 37 (2011): 417-436 
Clark, Janine , and Washeke M. Michuki. 2009. “Women and NGO Professionalization: A 
Case Study of Jordan.” Development in Practice 19 (3): 329– 39.    (2014-02-19). Theorizing 
NGOs: States, Feminisms, and Neoliberalism (Next Wave: New Directions in Women's 
Studies) (Kindle Locations 6660-6661). Duke University Press. Kindle Edition. 
CNN Arabic. Who is Naglaa Morsi, the First Lady of Egypt? 25 June 2012 
Cooke Myriam. Women Claim Islam: Creating Islamic Feminism through Literature. New 
York: Routledge,2001 
 Cooke Myriam. Religion, gender, and the MuslimWoman: deploying the Muslim Woman. 
Journal of Feminist Studiesin Religion. 24 (2008):91–99   
Dahi, Omar. Understanding the Political Economy of the Arab Revolt. Middle East Research 
Information Project,271(2014), 259-261. 
Deeb Lara. An Enchanted Modern: Gender and Public Piety in Shi’i Lebanon. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press,2006 
El Sheikh, Mayy (27 June 2012). "Egypt's Everywoman Finds Her Place is In The 
Presidential Palace". The New York Times. Retrieved 25 November 2012. 
El Sheikh, Mayy; Kirkpatrick, David D (27 June 2012). "Egypt's Everywoman Finds Her 
Place is in the Presidential Palace". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 12 
August 2012. Retrieved 12 August 2012. 
Elyachar, Julia. Markets of Dispossession: NGOs, Economic Development, and the State in 
Cairo. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005. 
Erickson, K. V., & Thomson, S. . First Lady International Diplomacy: Performing Gendered 
Roles on the World Stage. Southern Communication Journal, 77(2012), 239-262 
Fisher, Fowler. NGOs and the Political Development of the Third World. Kumaria Press 
Bookson International Development, 1997. 
 17 
Ghannam, Farha. Mobility, Liminality, and Embodiment in Cairo, Egypt. American  
Ethnologist. 38(2011):790–800 
Ghodsee, Kristen. . “Feminism-by-Design: Emerging Capitalisms, Cultural Feminism, and 
Women’s Nongovernmental Organizations in Postsocialist Eastern Europe.” Signs 29 
(2004): 727– 53. 
 ———.The Red Riviera: Gender, Tourism, and Postsocialism on the Black Sea. Next Wave. 
Durham: Duke University Press ,2005   
Gökarıksel, Banu and Ellen McLarney, “Introduction: Muslim Women, Consumer Capitalism 
and Islamic Culture Industry” Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies, 6(2010): 1-18. 
Gould, Lewis. American First Ladies. New york: Garland Publishing company,1996 
 Gutin ,Myra. The President’s Partner: First Lady in the 20th Century. New York: Greenwood 
Press,1989. 
Haddad, Bassam. The Syrian Regime Business Backbone. Middle East Research Information 
Project, 271(2014). 262-264. 
Hafez Sherine. An Islam of Her Own: Reconsidering Religion and Secularism in Women’s 
Islamic Movements. New York: N. Y. Univ. Press, 2011 
Hale Sandra. Gender Politics in Sudan: Islamism, Socialism, and the State. Boulder, CO: 
Westview, 1996. 
Hanieh, Adam. Lineages of Revolt: Issues of Contemporary Capitalism in the Middle East. 
Haymarket books, 2013. 
Hasso Francis . Feminist generations? The long-term impact of social movement 
involvement on Palestinian women’s lives. American Journal of Sociology 107(2001):586–
611   
 Hatem Mirvat. Egyptian discourses on gender and political liberalization: Do secularist 
and Islamist views really differ? Middle East Journal. 48 (1994):661–76   
Hatem Mirvat In the shadow of the state: changing definitions of Arab women’s 
“developmental” citizenship rights. Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies 1(2005):20–45 
Jad, Islah. “The Demobilization of a Palestinian Women’s Movement: From Empowered 
Active Militants to Powerless and Stateless ‘Citizens.’” The MIT Electronic Journal of Middle 
East Studies 8 (2008): 94-111. 
Joseph S, ed. 2000. Gender and Citizenship in the Middle East. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse Univ. 
Press.  
 18 
Joya, Angela. ‘Syria and the Arab Spring: The Evolution of the Conflict and the Role of 
Domestic and External Factors’, Ortadoğu Etütleri (Turkish Journal of Middle Eastern 
Studies), Vol. 4(20120, 27-55. 
Kandiyoti Deniz. Bargaining with patriarchy. Gender Soc. 2(1998):274–90   
Kandiyoti Deniz, ed. Women, Islam and the State. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991 
Kandiyoti Deniz. Between the hammer and the anvil: post-conflict reconstruction, Islam, 
and women’s rights. Third World Q. 28 (2007):503–17   
Karim, Lamia.. Politics of the Poor: NGOs and Grass-Roots Political Mobilization in 
Bangladesh. PoLAR 24 (2001): 92– 107. 
———.Microfinance and Its Discontents: Women in Debt in Bangladesh. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2011 
Kassam, Shelina. Marketing an Imagined Muslim Woman: Muslim girl Magazine and the 
Politics of Rave, Gender and Representation. Social Identities. 17(2011): 543-564. 
Keddie Nikki. Women in the Middle East: Past and Present. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2007. 
Keddie Nikki, Baron B, eds. Women in Middle Eastern History: Shifting Boundaries in Sex and 
Gender. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991 
Lorber Judith. Heroes, warriors and burqas: a feminist sociologist’s reflections on 
September 11. Sociol. Forum 17 (2002):377–96 
Macgregor, H (2001). Grand Entrance; Glamorous activist Queen Rania of Jordan challenges 
the world's notion of what an Arab-born first lady can be.Los Angeles Times 04 Apr 2001 
Mahmood Saba.  Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton Univ. Press, 2005.  
Malik, Nesrine. Syria’s First Lady has a UK Passport that does not make her Good. Guardian. 
February 7, 2012. 
Mamdani, Mahmoud. Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War and the Root of 
terror. NY: Harmony Press, 2005. 
Menkes, Suzzie. 2007. Best Dressed of all time: Bazar pays homage to the women who have 
always gotten it right. September 5, 2007. 
Mir-Hussein, Ziba. Religious Modernists and the Women Challenges and Complicities, 
Hoogland  (ed). Islam in Transition, USA: Syracuse University Press,2000. 
 19 
Mobayed, Sami. A Sheika ,A Queen, and A First Lady. Asia times Online. March,28, 2008. 
Available online at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JC28Ak01.html. 
Moallem Minoo. Between Warrior Brother and Veiled Sister: Islamic Fundamentalism and the 
Politics of Patriarchy in Iran. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005. 
Moghadam Valentine.. Islamic feminism and its discontents: toward a resolution of the 
debate. Signs: Journal of  Women in Culture and Society. 27(2002):1135–71 
 Moghadam Valentine.  Globalizing Women: Gender, Globalization, and Transnational 
Feminist Networks. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press,2005 
Ramadani, Nabila (2011). Asma al Assad is no reformer: Syria; s chanel-clad first lady 
rumored to be hiding in London- has long played a double game. New Statesman. May 26, 
2011. http://www.newstatesman.com/middle-east/2011/05/lady-asma-syria-assad-
london 
Robinson. Glenn. Defensive Democratization in Jordan. International Journal of Middle East 
Studies 30 (1998): 387-410 
Schwedler, Jillian. Amman Cosmopolitan: Spaces and Practices of Aspirations and 
Conumptions. Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, 30(2010), 
547-562. 
 
Saeed, S. 2012. Asma al-Assad as a hope for peace because she wears Louis Vuitton? 
Guardian, April 20, 2012.  
Said Edward.  Orientalism. New York: Pantheon Books,1978.  
Sonbol Amira El Azhary. Women of Jordan: Islam, Labor & the Law. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse 
Univ. Press, 2003.  
Sonbol Amira El Azhary, (ed) .Beyond the Exotic: Women’s Histories in Islamic Societies. 
Syracuse, NY: Syracuse Univ.Press, 2005.  
Taraki, Lisa. “Islam Is the Solution: Jordanian Islamists and the Dilemma of the 
'Modern Woman.'” British Journal of Political Science 46 (1995): 643–61 
The Huffington Post: Asma al –Assad: Syria’s First Lady and all Natural Beauty. December 7, 
2008.  
The Star. 2010. King and Queen Attend Fifteen Years of Giving. November 29,  
Telegraph. 2011. Top Five Royal Brides. April 19, 2011.  
 20 
The New Zealand Herald. 2011 Royal beauties and beasts. April 18, 2011 Monday 
Vasan, Sudha.  NGO s as Employers: Need for Accountability.” Economic and Political 
Weekly 39 (2004): 2197– 98.   
Vogue . Power Monarch; 199 (2003):440 
Wiktorowicz, Quintan. The Political Limits to Nongovernmental Organizations in 
Jordan.World Development,30 (2002),77-93. 
Williams, B. 2010. First lady Asma Assad of Syria discusses the East, her family and the 
future of Syria. NBC Interview 
Winegar Jessica.  The privilege of revolution: gender, class, space, and affect in Cairo. 
American. Ethnologist 39(2012): 67–70 
Williams Juliet. Unholy matrimony? Feminism, orientalism, and the possibility of double 
critique. Signs: Journal of . Women in Culture and Society. 34 (2009):611–32 
Woods, V (200). Queen Rania: Royal Appeal. Vogue Magazine. Available Online at: 
http://www.vogue.com/magazine/article/queen-rania-royal-appeal/#1.  
Zubaida, Sami. Beyond Islam: A New Understanding of the Middle East. London: I.B. Taruis, 
2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“ In the rural area, the trust depended on the existing organizational structures of 
the unions of peasants in which rural women actively participated. These women 
became the link between the trust and local women, either as employees or as 
volunteers,” according to Kabbani.50 While this was not the case for JRF who had to 
establish these links and relations. Second, by the kinds of products produced by 
these NGOs, which is itself a result of the different social structures of the rural areas 
of Jordan and Syria. The products of Jordanian women are more textile and other 
Tribal artifacts, some desert herbs packaged for the tourists, while the products of 
the Syria trust is all sorts of food provisions, such as dried fruits and vegetables, 
different sorts of jams, olives produce that rural women find in abundance in the 
agricultural areas of Syria besides, textiles and other artifacts. “ It is important to 
                                                        
50 Personal Interview with Kabbani, April, 12, 2009. 
 21 
mention here that the Syrian women who used to work in their own land before the 
adoption of social market economy, lost access to land due to the reverse land 
reform and the introduction of agribusiness to rural Syria. Most of these women 
were now agricultural labourere for multi national corporations, and our role in 
Trust was to help them create ideas around remnants of agricultural waste such as 
the wheat and rice stalks,” says Abir, one of the rural development employee in the 
trust51. 
 
                                                        
51 Personal Interview March 17, 2009.  
